How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company by Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli






Phone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425
Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409
http://www.CESifo.de
________________________
* This is a revised version of the working paper entitled “Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy“
(Cornelli and Felli 1998). We are grateful to Patrick Bolton, Dick Brealy, Julian Franks, Oliver Hart, Ronen Israel, Fran‚ois Ortalo-
Magné, Ben Polak, Oved Yosha, David Webb, Luigi Zingales, Jeff Zwiebel, Bilge Yilmaz and seminar participants at Tel-Aviv
University, HEC Paris, London Business School, London School of Economics, Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank, Wharton and
the AFA meetings for very helpful discussions and  comments. Financial support from the Bank of Italy is gratefully acknowledged.
We are solely responsible for any remaining errors. This paper was completed while the authors were visiting the Wharton School
and the Department of Economics at the University of Pennsylvania respectively. Their generous hospitality is gratefully
acknowledged.




Working Paper No. 292CESifo Working Paper No. 292
May 2000
HOW TO SELL A (BANKRUPT) COMPANY
Abstract
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of
such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that
maximizes the creditors‘ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the
option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the
company. Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors reduce to
a minimum the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hands
of the buyer.
Keywords: Bankruptcy, control stakes, auction
JEL Classification: G33, D74
Francesca Cornelli
London Business School
Institute of Finance and Accounting





London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
UKHow to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company
Abstract: The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale
of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that
maximizes the creditors' proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option
left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company.
Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors reduce to a minimum
the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hands of the buyer.
1. Introduction
A bankruptcy procedure | or, even before bankruptcy, any restructuring in a situa-
tion of nancial distress | has to choose the destiny of the insolvent rm. Usually
the ownership and control of the company is transferred in new hands, which are in
general dierent from the previous owners or even from the creditors (who have the
control during the bankruptcy procedure). In other words, bankruptcy often leads to
the sale of the company. This paper suggests a way to sell a bankrupt company that
maximizes the creditors proceeds from the sale.
Maximizing the creditors' proceeds from the sale of a bankrupt company is not
the rst quality of a bankruptcy procedure that comes to mind. Indeed, a bankruptcy
procedure is usually considered ecient if it allocates the company assets in the hands
of individuals that maximize the value of the company. We label this quality of a
bankruptcy procedure ex-post eciency.
Ex-post eciency does not take into account the eect that the destiny of the
bankrupt company has on the incentives of the involved parties before the rm
goes into bankruptcy, even before any clue of nancial distress is at the horizon.
A bankruptcy procedure that does a good job at promoting these incentives can be
regarded as ex-ante ecient.
Two groups of stake-holders play a critical role in the life of a company. These
are the entrepreneurs or managers of the company and its creditors. A bankruptcy
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procedure `punishing' managers or entrepreneurs of the insolvent rm (for example
not giving them control even when it is ex-post ecient to do so) may be seen as
ex-ante ecient. It provides entrepreneurs with the right incentives to manage the
rm so as to avoid ending up in nancial distress, for example by not undertaking
too many risks. The eects of dierent bankruptcy procedures on the managers' and
entrepreneurs' incentives have been extensively studied in the literature (e.g. Aghion
and Bolton 1992, Berkovitch, Israel, and Zender 1993, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996).
This paper focuses on a dierent aspect of ex-ante eciency: the protection of the
creditors' claims. By protection of creditors' claims we mean the attempt to maximize
the proceeds to the creditors from the reorganization of the rm. The revenues to
the creditors may seem, from an ex-post point of view, a pure transfer and therefore
irrelevant. However, a bankruptcy procedure which maximizes creditors' proceeds
from the sale of the company when it is in nancial distress may reduce the company's
overall costs of borrowing. This has clear eciency implications. Investment projects
that would be nanced under a bankruptcy procedure which protects creditors' claims
would not be nanced under bankruptcy procedures which allocate the company
eciently but sacrice creditors' revenues.1
Key to our proposed way to sell a bankrupt company is a very simple point: it
is never optimal to sell the entire ownership of the company. Instead, it is always
optimal to leave the creditors the option to retain an equity stake in the distressed
rm. Indeed, it is possible to transfer the control of the company in the hands of the
individual that maximizes its value without transferring all the shares in his hands.
Hence, by retaining a minority stake in the company creditors can capture the entire
increase in the market value of the company at least on this minority stake and in so
doing maximize their returns.
1The observation that protecting creditors' claims has clear eciency implications may seem
surprising, given that it is usually argued that giving creditors too much power in a bankruptcy
procedure may induce them to liquidate too often (e.g. Aghion, Hart, and Moore 1992, Franks and
Torous 1989). However, this happens when creditors, by liquidating, can be entirely reimbursed.
Clearly in this case increasing revenues is not a creditors' concern. However, if | as usual in a
bankruptcy situation | the value of the company, even when maximized, is less than the sum of
the credits, creditors will want to maximize their revenues.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 3
Of course, if creditors knew the value of the company in the hands of potential
buyers then maximizing revenues would be even easier. They could make a take-it-
or-leave-it oer to the buyer who is willing to pay more and capture all the increase
in value of the rm. However, one of the major sources of complexity and delays in
bankruptcy is the diculty in evaluating what will be the value of the company in
dierent hands.2 Potential buyers value the company dierently because they may
have dierent plans for the future or because of synergies with their other businesses.
Creditors will in general not know for sure how much these buyers are prepared to
pay and will need to rely on the competition among buyers to identify the individual
who is willing to pay more for the company. However, if the company has dierent
values in the hands of dierent individuals, competition among buyers is not perfect
and creditors will not be able to capture the whole value of the company. As a result,
the buyer is able to obtain the company for a price lower than its value. In many
situations, the value attached to a bankrupt company may dier so much among
potential buyers that the price may end up to be substantially lower.
Our proposal aims to reduce this rent which is left to the buyer, increasing the
returns to the creditors who are selling the company. The intuition is very simple:
by transferring control and retaining an equity stake in the company, the creditors
can make sure that at least on this equity stake they capture the full value of the
company and minimize the rents left in the hands of the ecient buyer. In other
words, by auctioning o only a fraction of the company, the creditors reduce the
dierences among potential buyers, making in this way competition stronger and
therefore reducing the buyer's rents.
We show that the optimal way to sell the company is to auction o a fraction of
its equity (but always a fraction which entails control) and identify the size of this
fraction in dierent situations. In particular, when control does not entail any private
benets we show that it is always optimal to sell only the minimum stake necessary
to transfer control (Section 3). In other words, it is optimal to separate completely
2See, for example, the cases of Sunbeam-Oster (HBS # 5-293-046) and Marvel Entertainment
Group (HBS # 5-298-028).How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 4
the voting rights from the cash ow rights of the company: the creditor should sell
all the voting rights and possibly retain all the cash ow rights. This is due to the
fact that in the absence of private benets from control the individual who is willing
to pay more for the company is also the ecient buyer (i.e. the one who maximizes
the value of the company ex post).
However, one might argue that when there are no private benets from control
buyers should not have dierent willingnesses to pay. Even if the company has higher
value in someone else's hands, an individual can always acquire the control and then
resell it to someone who values it more. If, when bidding, the potential buyers take
into account the additional revenues from reselling the control stake, the amount each
buyer is willing to pay contains a common component, due to the option to resell.
We show that even in this case it is still optimal to auction o only the minimum
control stake of the company (Section 4). In fact, when reselling the company, a
seller will be able to capture only part of the value the company in the hands of the
buyer. Therefore the value of the option to resell in general does not reect the full
increase in the value of the company due to the transfer of control. By retaining a
minority stake instead the creditors can guarantee themselves the whole increase in
the company's value on this stake.
When the control of the rm in distress entails some private benets, it is no
longer optimal to sell only the minimum control stake. Private benets of control, in
fact, create a trade o between ex post and ex ante eciency, since the bidder who is
willing to pay the most for the minimum control stake of the company might not be
the one who maximizes the company's value. However, it might still be optimal for the
creditors to retain part of the equity stake of the rm (Section 5), but not necessarily
the minimum stake necessary to transfer control. In other words the creditors do
not want to separate completely the voting rights from the cash ow rights of the
company. Bundling these rights together but retaining as much as possible of the
cash ow rights of the rm allows the creditors to maximize their returns and to
attract the most buyer in whose hands the company's value is highest. The optimal
mechanism is then an auction of the lowest control stake that renders this buyer alsoHow to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 5
the individual with the highest willingness to pay for the company. In so doing the
creditors maximize the price paid by the buyer for the control stake of the company
(the voting rights) and, at the same time, the value of the minority stake (the cash
ow rights) left in their hands.
In most of our analysis the choice of the selling procedure which maximizes the
creditors' revenues does not imply a trade-o between ex-post and ex-ante eciency.
Indeed, the mechanism which we derive as optimal also allocates the company in the
hands of those who maximize its value (and in the case of private benets we adjust
the fraction sold so that this result is still true). However, creditors have also the
option to further increase their proceeds by introducing a reservation price. This
introduces a trade-o between ex-ante and ex-post eciency, since a reservation price
entails a loss in ex post eciency. We show that reducing the fraction of the equity
auctioned o reduces the ex-post ineciency associated with the reservation price.
In other words, when the seller uses a reservation price, reducing the control stake
auctioned o improves both ex-post and ex-ante eciency.
A question that comes to mind, given the results described above, is whether this
bankruptcy procedure could be implemented in a decentralized way. In other words,
whether it is possible to transform the rm in distress in an all equity company,
distribute the shares of this company to the creditors and leave them free to decide
the fate of this new all-equity company. This would be equivalent to a privatization
of the bankruptcy procedure. In Section 6 we show that this procedure may achieve
the same revenues obtained by the centralized procedure (i.e. the optimal selling
procedure discussed above). However, this is only one of a whole set of equilibria of the
creditors' tendering game. Some of the equilibria of this game may be inecient and
prevent the creditors from maximizing their returns since each creditor may have an
incentive to free-ride on other creditors when deciding whether to transfer the control
of the company in the hands of the ecient buyer. In other words, a bankruptcy
law that disciplines and centralizes the creditors behaviour in bankruptcy may be
preferred to privatizing the bankruptcy procedure.
The main result of our analysis can shed light on some of the features of observedHow to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 6
bankruptcy cases. Usually, an observed increase in the creditors' equity stake at the
end of a bankruptcy restructuring is explained by the need to increase monitoring by
large shareholders (see for example Gilson (1990)), or more generally by the fact that
an increase in the creditors' stake might aect the value of the company. This paper
suggests that this might simply be the best way for the creditors to sell the rm and
recuperate as much as possible of their credits.
The analysis of this paper is relevant not only for the change of control in a
bankruptcy procedure, but also for any transfer of control. The reason we are focusing
on bankruptcy is that this is a natural environment in which a party (the creditors)
is the owner of a company and would rather sell for the highest possible return.
Whenever the transfer of control takes place in a non decentralized way, our result still
applies. An interesting other case to which our result applies is the spino of a division
of the company. In this case we show that the selling party (the original company)
has an interest in retaining an equity stake in the spino company. Therefore, the
IPO should be done only for a fraction of the equity and the remaining shares should
be sold in the market afterwards. In the next section we relate our paper to other
papers that focus on the transfer of control, and show how our results apply in that
context.
The rest of the paper is structured in the following way. We review the related
literature in Section 2. Section 3 presents the main result of the paper in the absence
of any private benet from control and under the assumption that potential buyers
cannot trade among themselves their acquired stake in the company. In Section 4 we
prove that the same result holds when we remove the latter assumption. We then
analyze in Section 5 how the result generalizes to the case in which the control of the
company entails private benets. Section 6 suggests how to implement the optimal
selling procedure of the bankrupt company and analyzes the possibility of privatizing
it. Section 7 concludes.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 7
2. Related Literature
The literature on bankruptcy is vast. However, very little of it is focused on how to
sell a bankrupt company and in general on the protection of creditors' claims. This
is the reason why the papers most closely related to ours are concerned mainly with
the transfer of control rather than with bankruptcy (Zingales 1995, Bebchuk 1994).
This is consistent with our claims that the results of our analysis are relevant for any
transfer of control even outside a bankruptcy procedure.
Zingales (1995) is the closest paper to ours. It analyzes how the owner of a rm can
extract the highest possible surplus from a raider. Zingales shows that the incumbent
may want to sell the minority stake of the rm on the stock market before facing
the raider, in order to free-ride on any increase in the value of the rm induced by
the transfer of control. The main dierence with our analysis lies in the fact that
Zingales focuses on the case in which only one raider is planning to take over the
rm, while we consider the case where there is competition among potential buyers
for the company.
In Zingales (1995), the incumbent, if he owns the entire company when bargaining
with a unique potential buyer, will not be able to extract any additional surplus from
the raider by selling only the control stake of the rm. In fact, when the incumbent
bargains with the raider, the reservation price that makes him indierent between
selling or not the rm will adjust. As a result, the amount of surplus the incumbent
will be able to extract is the same whatever stake of the company is sold. However,
this is not true if the incumbent has transformed the minority stake of the rm in cash
in advance by selling it on the stock market. Therefore, in Zingales (1995) the only
way in which the incumbent will be able to maximize the rent he extracts from the
raider, even in the absence of private benets from control, is by selling the minority
stake of the rm on the stock market in advance.
In our analysis, this is not true. Indeed the presence of competition among poten-
tial buyers for the rm prevents the reservation value of the incumbent (the creditors
in our case) from adjusting when selling only the control stake. Therefore it is strictly
optimal for the creditors to retain the minority stake of the rm so as to extract theHow to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 8
highest surplus from the potential buyers.3
The other paper on the transfer of control that is relevant for our analysis is Be-
bchuk (1994). This paper analyzes the eciency properties of dierent procedures for
the sale of control of a company in the presence of private benets from control. Be-
bchuk shows that a procedure that does not give any say to the minority shareholders
of the company (market rule) may result in inecient transfers of control, while a
procedure that does give a veto power to minority shareholders (equal opportunity
rule) may prevent ecient transfers of control. The paper is closely related to the
analysis we present in Section 5.
In Bebchuk (1994) the critical condition that yields (ex post) ineciencies in the
transfer of control is whether the private benets of the seller and the buyer of the
company are positive or negatively correlated with the benets that are shared by the
minority shareholders. The equivalent condition in our analysis (Section 5 below) is
whether the private benets of potential buyers are positively or negatively correlated
with the public or transferable benets associated with their shareholding. The main
dierence with our analysis is that, since we consider a structured procedure, creditors
with minority stake will not free-ride, hence the transfer of control will always be
ex-post ecient. However, the correlation between private and public benets will
determine the proportion of shares in excess of the minimum necessary to transfer the
control that creditors will decide to auction o. In a privatized bankruptcy procedure,
however, creditors have an incentive to free-ride and ex-post ineciencies may arise
(Section 6).
Another paper of relevance for our analysis is Riley (1988). This paper shows
that in the sale, for example, of oilelds the expected revenue of the seller is raised
by using royalty rates. In other words the seller increases its revenues by making the
winner's payment a function of the information revealed during the auction and of
any signal of the value of the object auctioned o that might become available after
3Also in the case in which there is only one potential buyers, if the incumbent does not know the
buyer's willingness to pay, our result holds, and it is optimal to use the number of shares sold as a
screening device (Cornelli and Li 1997).How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 9
the oileld is sold. The relationship with our analysis can be seen in the similarity
between royalty rates and cash ow rights. However, Riley's result holds only when
the values of the oileld in the hands of the potential buyers are correlated across
buyers (the case analyzed is aliated values) while our result holds also when the
rm's values in the hands of potential bidders are independent (see Section 3).
In particular, in Riley (1988) royalty fees allow the price paid by the winning
bidder to depend on the entire information on the value of the oileld revealed during
the auction as well as on any information revealed after the auction. Whenever the
information revealed does not aect the values of the oileld to potential buyers,
royalty fees do not aect the seller's revenue.
Our result instead holds also when the information revealed in the auction does
not aect the dierent values of the rm in the hands of potential buyers. Indeed, our
result depends on the fact that it is possible to transfer the control of a rm without
necessarily transferring all the cash ow rights.
Finally, few recent papers have discussed the role of auctions in bankruptcy. Baird
(1986) and Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992) argue that in a world without cash or
credit constraints (like the one we are analyzing) auctions are an ecient bankruptcy
procedure, distributional issues not withstanding. We do not disagree with this point.
However, we argue that an auction achieves ex post eciency (since it allocates the
rm's control optimally) but does not necessarily maximize the creditors' proceeds,
if the creditors are required to auction o the entire company, as it usually happens
in bankruptcy procedures. In other words, modifying the procedure so as to allow
the creditors to auction o only the control stake of the rm may increase creditors'
revenues. Notice that the fact that it is optimal for the creditors to retain an equity
stake in the company has the avor of non-cash auctions (as in Aghion, Hart, and
Moore (1992) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishnathan (2000)), where bidders may oer to
the seller equity stakes in the company. However, we show below that in our set-up it
is never optimal for the bidders to spontaneously oer equity stakes (since it reduces
their rent) and therefore it is up to the sellers (the creditors) to obtain it by reducing
the control stake sold.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 10
3. How to Sell the Company
Let us consider a rm, whose capital structure consists of common stock and straight
debt, which has declared bankruptcy. The debt is owned by N creditors.
Creditors may be compensated with cash and with share participation in the re-
organized rm. We rule out the possibility to compensate creditors through debt
claims in the re-organized rm. In what follows we show that this implies no loss in
generality.
How the creditors share the returns from the re-organization of the rm is not
relevant for our analysis: our result holds true whatever way the creditors choose to
share the returns. The only thing that is relevant from our view point is the sum of
the returns to all creditors.
We characterize the optimal way to sell this company. Assume that the value of
the rm depends on who acquires the control stake of the rm. In particular we take
the company to have dierent values depending on who obtains the control. Let us
denote the value of the rm in the hands of individual i as Vi. We further assume that
an individual does not need to acquire all the shares of a rm to have the control. In
particular we take 0 <  < 1 to denote the amount of shares necessary to have the
control of the rm.4
In this section we assume that these values Vi are specic to each potential buyer
and are independent across them (private values). The next section however considers
the case in which whoever obtains the control of the rm can resell it to someone who
could increase the company value. If in this way the original buyer could increase his
payo, the resulting situation would be one of common rather than private values.
Finally, in Section 5 we analyze the case in which the control of the rm entails private
benets from control.
All three cases are analyzed in two scenarios. First we consider the full information
case with two potential buyers and assume that the mechanism to allocate control is
4We take  to be exogenous in the paper, we discuss in the conclusions what is the optimal level
of  if the creditors are free to choose the control stake of the bankrupt rm.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 11
an auction. All the intuition of the results can be obtained from the full information
case. However, one may object that when the seller knows perfectly well what is the
buyers' willingness to pay, he does not need to set up an auction: he will just make a
take-it-or-leave-it oer to the buyer with the highest willingness to pay and extract
all the surplus from the buyer. Of course, this is not a realistic situation: creditors
do not know what will be the rm's value in the hands of other investors. Therefore,
we also develop a general model with asymmetric information where we prove that
the auction is optimal. This is done in order to make sure that our recommendation
(not to sell the entire company) does hold in the realistic situation in which creditors
do not know the potential buyers' willingness to pay.
One may argue that|although auctions have been recommended as the best
method to sell the company in a bankruptcy procedure|in reality other methods
are used (for example, Chapter 11 is a bargaining procedure). In the context of our
paper the auction is only one of the optimal selling procedures which can be used.
Other indirect mechanisms will implement the optimum. We use an auction only
because it is easier to convey the intuition in that context. What is important is that
any optimal mechanism will involve the sale only of a control stake of the company.
3.1. The Perfect Information Case
Consider a situation in which there exist only two potential buyers, labelled 1 and 2,
for the insolvent rm, none of them a creditor.5 Each potential buyer has a specic
plan on how to run the company if in control and the rm, under his control, has
value V1 and V2, respectively. Without loss of generality, let us assume that V1 < V2.
We assume that the entire valuation Vi, i = 1;2, represents the rm's market value,
transferable and public, and the control of the rm does not yield any private benet.
We analyze the case with private benets in Section 5.
5This assumption is needed to simplify the analysis of the equilibrium outcome of the auction.
Indeed, in the event that a potential buyer is one of the creditors there would exist incentives for
him to overbid as exemplied in Burkart (1995) and Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999). The
result presented below, however, still holds.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 12
We show that in this situation it is never optimal for the creditors to sell the
entire company. If the creditors sell the entire company through an auction, the
unique equilibrium of the auction is such that buyer 2 obtains the rm at the price
V1.6 This is ex post ecient, since the value of the rm is maximized in the hands of
buyer 2. However, the creditors could have obtained a higher revenue by structuring
the auction dierently.
Assume instead that only the minimum number of shares necessary to have con-
trol, , is auctioned o.7 Then buyer 2 buys  shares and obtains the control, paying
V1. The creditors are now left with a minority stake (1   ) of a rm whose total
value is V2. The total revenue accruing to the creditors are:
V1 + (1   )V2 > V1: (1)
Notice that, unless the creditors decide to auction o only the control stake of
the rm, the competition between the two buyers never leads to the equilibrium bid
[V1 + (1   )V2]. In other words, the buyers never voluntarily bid for only a fraction
of the rm, since bidding for the entire rm maximizes the surplus appropriated by
the winner, (V2   V1).
Of course, another way to obtain the same revenues is to auction o the entire
rm with a reservation price of V1 + (1   )V2. The possibility to auction o only
the control stake of the rm is then useful to identify the highest credible reservation
price. However, in a perfect information setting it is not meaningful to talk about
reservation price (since the seller knows the buyers' willingness to pay), so we will
discuss reservation prices only in a setting of asymmetric information, where we can
look for the optimal way to sell the company (instead of assuming that the company
is sold through an auction).
6Notice that the equilibrium described is the unique trembling-hand-perfect equilibrium of this
simple auction game. Here trembling-hand perfection is used in a standard way to prevent bidder 1
from submitting a bid (not selected in equilibrium) that exceeds the value the rm has in his hands.
Notice also that this result holds true when the auction is structured as a rst price auction.
7We discuss in the conclusions the case in which  is endogenized and the creditors can choose
the voting structure of the control shares.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 13
3.2. The Private Information Case
Let us now assume that each valuation Vi is private information of buyer i but it is
common knowledge that each Vi is drawn independently from the same distribution
function F() over the interval [0;  V ], with density f(). If V = (Vj)j2N, and V i =
(Vj)j2N;j6=i, we can dene





with corresponding densities g(V ) and g i(V i).
Let us look at the selling procedure which maximizes the creditors' revenue.
By the Revelation Principle, it is possible to restrict attention to the direct rev-
elation mechanisms where the buyers simultaneously announce their valuation ~ Vi to
the creditors and the creditors choose the mechanism fpi(~ V );ti(~ V );g, where pi(~ V )
is the probability that buyer i gets control; ti(~ V ) is the amount he has to pay and
 is the proportion of shares sold. We look for a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this
mechanism in which buyers truthfully reveal their own valuations.
If the rm has value Vi under the control of buyer i, then his expected payo when
declaring ~ Vi is given by the value of his equity stake minus the payment to creditors:




Vi pi(~ Vi;V i)   ti(~ Vi;V i)

g i(V i)dV i: (2)
The creditors revenues are given by the total payments from the buyers plus the









[1   ]Vi pi(V )
#
g(V )dV: (3)
The creditors maximize their revenues in (3) with respect to , pi and ti subject
to several constraints. The individual rationality constraint (which guarantees thatHow to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 14
each buyer is willing to participate):
Ui(Vi;Vi)  0; 8i 2 N; 8Vi 2 [0;  V ]; (4)
the incentive compatibility constraint (which guarantees that each buyer will declare
his true value Vi)




pi(V )  1; (6)
    1: (7)
The incentive compatibility condition, constraint (5), can be rewritten as a max-
imization problem. The rst and second order conditions of such problem are then
necessary to guarantee that truth telling is optimal for all the bidders. Following My-
erson (1981), we show in Appendix A.1 how we can utilize the rst order conditions














We can now derive what is the best way in which creditors should sell the company.
Proposition 1. If F(V ) has a monotonic increasing hazard rate, the optimal selling
procedure is an auction where the creditors sell  shares to the highest bidder.
Proof: The objective function (8) is decreasing in , therefore it is optimal to set 
as low as possible. Once we set  =  the problem coincides with Myerson (1981)'s
optimal auction problem. Hence the optimal selling procedure is an auction. Further,How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 15
by looking at the second order conditions of the incentive compatibility problem (5)
derived in Appendix A.1 it is easy to see that they are satised for a constant  = .
Therefore, also in a general set-up it is always optimal to sell the minimum possible
number of shares, .
Notice that the above selling mechanism is ex-post ecient, since the rm is
allocated in the hands of the investor who maximizes its value. However, this is
due to the fact that we ignored the possibility to impose a reservation price. In the
corollary below we introduce this possibility.
Corollary 1. It is optimal for the creditors to sell the company to buyer i only if
Vi  V , where V  is dened so that
V
   




Proof: It is easy to see that if Vi < V  then V    
1 F(V )
f(V ) < 0 and it is therefore
optimal to set pi(V ) = 0.
The reservation price introduces a trade-o between ex ante and ex post eciency.
Setting a reservation price increases the creditors' expected revenues, but it introduces
some ex post ineciency. This ineciency arises when the buyer with the highest
willingness to pay has a valuation Vi lower than V  (or, in terms of the auction, his
bid is below the reservation price). In this case the rm will not be sold, although its
value is maximized in the hands of that buyer.8
An important observation, however, is that the ineciency introduced by imposing
a reservation price is reduced if we do not sell the entire company. In fact, if we sell a
8We are assuming that the rms has no value if it remains in the hands of the creditors. It is
possible to assume that the rm has a value also in the hands of creditors and this introduces an
additional reason for introducing a reservation price (that does not increase ex post ineciency).
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fraction  of the company, V  is given by V  [1 F(V )]=f(V ) = 0. Since we are
assuming that F(Vi) has a monotonic increasing hazard rate h(Vi) = f(Vi)=[1 F(Vi)],










In other words, if creditors sell a lower fraction of the company, the reservation price
also decreases and, consequently, the ex-post ineciency introduced by the reservation
price is reduced. Therefore, reducing the fraction of equity sold increases both ex ante
and ex post eciency.
4. Trading among bidders
One possible objection to the procedure suggested above is that the result relies on
the fact that we do not allow the buyers to trade the (control stake of the) rm, once
it is in their hands. One might argue that if we allow the buyers to trade stakes of the
rm between themselves the value of the rm would be the same for all the bidders.
Therefore selling a control stake would be equivalent to selling the entire rm.
In this section we show that our result holds even if we allow buyers to trade stakes
of the rm among themselves. In other words, it is still optimal for the creditors to
retain the minority stake of the rm and to sell only the control stake. The intuition
is that, when reselling the company, a bidder will be able to capture only part of the
value of the company in the hands of the buyer depending on his bargaining power.
Therefore the value of the option to resell in general does not reect the full increase
in the value of the company due to the transfer of control. However, by retaining a
minority stake the creditors can guarantee themselves the full increase in value of the
company at least on the minority stake they retain.
Once again we proceed in two stages. We rst prove the result in the simple two
buyers perfect information case and then we generalize it to the case of N buyers
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4.1. The Perfect Information Case with Trading
Consider the case in which we allow trading of the stakes of the rm among buyers.
In other words, assume that buyer 1, after purchasing the rm, can resell it to buyer
2. Let trading be organized in the following two periods. In the rst period, the
creditors of the bankrupt rm auction o either the entire rm or its control stake;
while in the second period, buyers may re-trade it between each other.
We start from the second period in which buyers trade between each other. In-
dependently from the number of bidders that participate in the auction, this stage
takes the form of a bilateral trade between the bidder who got the rm in the rst
period (say bidder 1) and the bidder that can maximize the ex-post value of the rm
(bidder 2) | as long as these two bidders are not the same individual, of course. In
the second period we can therefore refer to these two players as the buyer and the
seller.
If in the rst period the entire rm is auctioned o, in the second period it is a
weakly optimal strategy for the seller to trade only the control stake of the rm 
and retain the minority stake for herself (since the same intuition that we derived
in the section before holds also here). As a consequence, if the entire rm has been
auctioned o in the rst period, in the second one we can restrict attention to the
case in which the investor who won the auction is going to sell only a fraction  of
its equity.
To keep the model of bilateral trade as simple as possible we make the standard
assumption that with probability   the seller (bidder 1) makes a take-it-or-leave-it
oer to the buyer (bidder 2), and with the complementary probability (1    ) the
buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the seller.
In order to solve the game, we have to determine the reservation price of both
parties in period 2. The highest price the buyer is willing to pay for the control stake
is V2 (i.e. his entire surplus from obtaining the control stake ). The lowest price
the seller is willing to accept for the control stake of the rm is slightly more complex.
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or retaining it for himself. If only the control stake of the rm is auctioned o in
period one, then this reservation price is V1. If instead the entire rm is auctioned
o in period one, then the price for the control stake of the company V is such that
V + (1   )V2 = V1.9
Consider rst the case in which the entire rm is auctioned o in period one. The
price the seller is able to obtain in period two for the control stake of the rm is:
[ V2 + (1    )V ] (9)
which yields a total revenue to the seller equal to:

 = (1   )V2 + [ V2 + (1    )V ] =  V2 + (1    )V1: (10)
Equation (10) identies the highest willingness to pay of bidder 1 in the auction in
period one and, hence, the equilibrium winning bid. In other words, equation (10)
species the total returns to the creditors when they auction o the entire rm in
period one.10
Consider now the case in which the creditors auction o only the control stake of
the rm in period one. The price the seller is able to obtain in period two is:
[ V2 + (1    )V1] (11)
This will be the equilibrium winning bid in the auction of the control stake in period
one. Hence, the total returns to the creditors are:

 = (1   )V2 + [ V2 + (1    )V1] (12)
9For simplicity we assume that V1 > (1   )V2. The whole analysis can be easily adjusted to
account for the case in which the above inequality is not satised.
10Equation (10) shows that it does not matter whether bidder 1 trades the entire rm or only its
control stake in period two. He is in fact indierent. The reason is that the reservation value in the
bargaining between the seller and the buyer of the rm at time 2 diers in these two cases so as to
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Clearly the returns to the creditors are greater when only the control stake of the
rm is auctioned o in period one ( > ).
The intuition behind this result is simple. By auctioning o only a control stake of
the rm the creditors can guarantee themselves a share of the future value of the rm
(1   )V2 that is not going to be aected by the future trade (hence, the bargaining
power) between bidders.
A separate issue concerns the case in which the bidder with the higher valuation
for the rm is not present at the auction but is available only later on. This is not
so unusual in the cases of bankruptcy of large rms, where it is not easy to nd
immediately the best possible buyers. Sometimes delays in Chapter 11 have been
justied by the need to look around for the best buyer. We therefore ask whether it
may be optimal for the creditors to hold on to the company, waiting for the individual
in whose hands the value of the rm is highest to materialize. We show that, even
with no discounting, creditors are strictly better o by allocating the control stake
of the rm immediately. The reason is that the bidders are able to internalize the
possibility to resell the rm and at the auction stage the competition among potential
buyers provides the seller with the opportunity to extract a higher surplus from them.
Assume that after the auction an individual, labelled 3, with valuation V3 > V2
will want to buy the rm and assume no discounting. Assume that this information
is known to all the parties to the bankruptcy. If the creditors have not yet sold the
rm when buyer 3 appears they can bargain with this buyer and their proceeds are:
 V3 + (1    )V (13)
where V is the value of the rm when kept in the hands of the creditors. As in (12), it
does not matter in this bargaining whether the creditors sell the entire rm to buyer
3 or only the control stake.
Assume instead that the creditors auction o the control stake of the rm in period
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Then the value bidder i = 1;2 expects from the rm is
 V3 + (1    )Vi (14)
The winning bid is then [ V3 + (1    )V1] and the revenues from the auction are:
(1   )V3 + [ V3 + (1    )V1] (15)
Notice that even if V1 = V the revenues in (15) are higher than the revenues in (13).
4.2. The Private Information Case with Trading
We now proceed to consider the case in which potential buyers have private infor-
mation about the value of the rm under their control. To simplify the analysis, we
assume that after the shares are sold all Vis are common knowledge. In other words,
there is imperfect information only during the sale of the rm. This is admittedly a
strong assumption, but it allows us to focus on the issue of revelation of information
when creditors sell the rm, which is really what the paper is about, and avoid issues
of multiplicity of equilibria that would arise if there were asymmetric information at
the bargaining stage.
Assume that creditors have sold  shares to a buyer i with valuation Vi. This
value could be the highest possible for the rm or there may exist an individual j
whose valuation is higher than Vi. Consider the second case (Vi < Vj). As in the
previous section, individual i will sell only the minimum control stake to buyer j.
The price individual i is able to obtain from a buyer j is
[ Vj + (1    )V ]
where the lowest price i is willing to accept for the sale of the control stake of the
rm V is now
V = Vi   (   )Vj:How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 21
The resulting total revenue to i is then
[ Vj + (1    )Vi]:
If instead all the potential buyers have a valuation lower than Vi the shares are
not sold to anyone else.
Dene V
 
 i  fVj 2 (0;Vi);8j 6= ig the set of vectors of rm's values Vj such that
all values are strictly lower than Vi and V
+
 i its complement. If all the values Vj are
lower than Vi, there will be no trading in the second period, if instead at least one Vj
is higher than Vi, then there will be trading. Then
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The intuition behind this expression is quite simple and it is the same one that applies
in the case of perfect information: even when the willingness of a bidder is aected
by the option to resale, a higher Vi allows the buyer to extract a higher payment, in
proportion 1    , while only a fraction   of the highest value is extracted. We now
have all the elements to prove that auctioning o the minimum stake that transfers
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Proposition 2. If F(V ) has a monotonic increasing hazard rate, the optimal selling
procedure when bidders can trade their shares of the company after these shares are
allocated is an auction where the creditors sell  shares to the highest bidder.
Proof: Since F(V ) has an increasing hazard rate, it is optimal to set pi(V ) = 1 for
Vi = V max
j . Then, the objective function in (17) is monotonic decreasing in i. It is
therefore optimal to minimize i. Moreover, a constant i(V ) =  satises the second
order conditions of the incentive compatibility constraint as in the case of Proposition
1.
The intuition of what is happening is quite clear once we realize the optimal selling
mechanism is an auction: the creditors are still selling the control to the buyer with
the highest valuation (V max
j ), but the payment is determined by the second highest
willingness to pay. However, only the fraction of 1     which is extracted is relevant
for the payment, and that fraction is decreasing in .
Notice that also in this case it is optimal to impose a reservation price and not to
serve a buyer with valuation Vi < V  (where V  is dened as in the previous case),
therefore the same analysis applies.
5. Private Benets from Control
This section analyzes an environment in which the potential buyers of the rm derive
private benets from control. In this case we need to distinguish between the trans-
ferable or public benets (the market value) that the rm produces when in the hand
of bidder i, Vi, and the additional non-transferable or private benets Bi that accrue
only to bidder i from controlling the rm. The rm in the hands of dierent potential
buyers produces dierent public benets as well as dierent private benets.
In this setting it might still be optimal for the creditors not to sell the entire rm.
However this result critically depends on whether the public and the private benets
are positive or negatively correlated among the bidders. When they are positively
correlated there is no trade-o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are negatively correlated there is a trade-o and the result will depend on how acute
it is.
Once again in presenting our result we draw a distinction between the analysis of
the case in which both private and public benets are perfectly known and the case
in which private and public benets are privately known.
5.1. The Perfect Information Case with Private Benets
Positive Correlation. Consider the case in which there is perfect information on
the public and private benets of the two potential buyers for the rm. Further,
assume that the public benets V1 and V2 are positively correlated with the private
benets B1 and B2:
V1 < V2 and B1 < B2: (18)
A buyer who is more ecient at maximizing the public value of the company is also
more able to extract private benets from control. In this case, if the entire rm is
auctioned o, buyer 2 wins and pays
V1 + B1 (19)
Suppose, instead, that only the control stake  is auctioned o. The equilibrium price
of the auction of  shares is: [V1 + B1]. Indeed this is the maximum willingness to
pay of buyer 1 for the control stake of the rm. The total revenue accruing to the
creditors is therefore:
V1 + (1   )V2 + B1 (20)
Clearly the revenues in (20) exceed the revenues in (19). It is therefore optimal to
auction o the minimum control stake of the rm. When there is positive correlation,
there is no potential conict between public and private benets, so the only relevant
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and the same eect identied in the absence of private benets applies.
Negative Correlation. Consider now the case in which the public benets V1 and
V2 and the private benets B1 and B2 are negatively correlated:
V1 < V2 and B1 > B2: (21)
In this case it is not always a dominated choice for the creditors to sell the entire
rm. In particular we can distinguish the following three cases.
Case 1. The rst case is characterized by the following inequality:
V2 + B2 > V1 + B1: (22)
Although buyer 1 is better than buyer 2 at extracting private benets, these are not
very high and do not play a very important role. Inequality (22) implies that
V2 + B2 > V1 + B1: (23)
The total surplus is therefore maximized if buyer 2 obtains the control of the rm.11
Buyer 2 obtains the control as long as he buys at least the fraction  of the company.
If the entire rm is auctioned o, the creditors' returns V1 + B1 are clearly strictly
smaller than the creditors' returns if only the minimum control stake of the rm is
auctioned o: V1+(1 )V2+B1. Once again, in order to maximize their revenues,
creditors should sell only the minimum control stake of the rm.
In this case, although there is a trade-o between public value and private benets,
the private benets of control are not high enough to make a substantial dierence,
so the eect identied in the absence of private benets dominates.
11Notice that in the presence of private benets ex post eciency imply that the sum of the rm
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Case 2. The second case is characterized by the following pair of inequalities:
V2 + B2 < V1 + B1 (24)
and
V2 + B2 > V1 + B1: (25)
In this case the dierence in private benets is quite high. If only  is auctioned o,
we can see from (24) that the control is not allocated eciently: buyer 1 obtains it,
instead of buyer 2. This also reduces the revenues of the creditors: to see this, notice
that (24) and (25) imply that there exists a percentage of shares ,  <  < 1, such
that:
V2 + B2 = V1 + B1: (26)
In order to maximize their revenues, the creditors should auction o  shares of the
rm, rather than the entire rm or a fraction . Indeed, in this case, from (26),
bidder 2 will obtain the control stake of the rm. The creditors' returns will then be
V1 + B1 + (1   )V2 = V2 + B2
which are clearly higher than the creditors' returns if the entire rm is auctioned o,
V1 +B1. It is worth noticing that in this case the creditors extract the entire surplus
from the winning bidder by auctioning o a percentage of the shares of the rm that
is strictly bigger than the minimum control stake  but strictly smaller than 100 %.
Even in the presence of a substantial conict between private and public benets
from control, it is still optimal to sell as few shares as possible (compatibly with
maximizing the value of the company). The only dierence is that now  is the
minimum stake possible, since with a lower fraction the creditors would not sell the
company to the buyer who is going to maximize the total surplus. As a consequence,
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ecient way and the value of the minority stake left in the creditors' hands would
not be maximized.
Case 3. The last case is characterized by the highest dierence in private benets of
control, so that the following inequality holds:
V2 + B2  V1 + B1: (27)
Condition (27) implies that if the entire rm is auctioned o bidder 1 obtains the
rm and this is the ecient allocation. The creditors' returns in the latter case are:
V2 + B2: (28)
However given that by assumption V2 > V1 if the creditors decide to auction o
a percentage of the shares  which is sucient to transfer the control,    but
strictly smaller than 100%,  < 1, the creditors' returns are
V2 + (1   )V1 + B2: (29)
The returns in (28) are clearly higher than the returns in (29). In other words this is
the only case in our analysis in which it is strictly optimal for the creditors to auction
o the entire rm. This is because in this case benets of control are very high, so
that extracting these benets is the best the creditors can do.
To summarize, the presence of private benets of controls introduces a trade-o.
The public component of the rm value in the hands of potential buyers requires
the creditors to reduce the fraction of the equity sold to the minimum necessary to
transfer control. However, the presence of private benets from control may induce
the creditors to sell more than this minimum fraction, in order to make sure that the
rm is allocated eciently. The higher are the private benets of control (relative to
the market value of the rm) the higher the fraction of the equity which should be
sold.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 27
5.2. The Private Information Case with Private Benets
We now move to the case in which private as well as public benets are private
information of the N potential buyers. For tractability, we restrict our analysis to
the case in which there exists a linear relationship between private benets from
control and public or transferable values of the company:12
Bi =  B + Vi (30)
If  > 0 we are in a case with positive correlation. If instead  < 0 we have negative
correlation. Then a buyer i who obtains    shares has a payo
Vi + Bi =  B + ( + )Vi (31)
Under this assumption we characterize the optimal mechanism to sell the company.
This mechanism species also the fraction of shares to be sold.13 The mechanism
design problem is the same as in Section 3.2, with the only dierence that now
equation (2) becomes




 B + [ + ]Vi pi(~ Vi;V i)   ti(~ Vi;V i)

g i(V i)dV i: (32)















We have now all the elements to prove the following result.
12This assumption allows us to analyze the problem without addressing the issue of the multi-
dimensionality of the adverse selection faced by the creditors in this setting.
13Cornelli and Li (1997) show in a dierent context that the seller (in this case the creditors) could
actually do even better by not committing to a given number of shares to be sold, but by making 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Proposition 3. Assume F(V ) has a monotonic increasing hazard rate. The optimal
selling procedure depends on the value of :
A) If   < , the optimal mechanism is an auction of  shares of the company.
B) If   > , the optimal mechanism is an auction of  shares of the company, where
 is equal either to  or to the minimum between  and 1.
Proof: In Case (A) the objective function in (33) is monotonic decreasing in . It
is therefore optimal to minimize . In Case (B) the objective function is monotonic
increasing in  provided that    . Therefore it is optimal to choose the highest
 compatible with     if the choice is to allocate the rm to the bidder that
announces the highest Vi. Alternatively, it is optimal to choose the lowest  = 
provided that the choice is to allocate the rm to the bidder that announces the
lowest Vi. In either case the second order conditions are satised for a constant .
Case (A) covers all cases with positive correlation ( > 0) and the cases where 
is negative but not very high in absolute value. This is the case where there is no
trade o between public and private values (positive correlation) or the cases where
the trade o is not very acute (Case 1 of the previous section): the presence of private
benets of control does not change the problem in a substantial way and it is still
optimal to sell  shares.
Conversely, when   >  | Case (B) in Proposition 3 | it is still true that
creditors want to sell the minimum possible stake, but if they sell only  shares they
are going to attract the buyer with the lowest public value Vi. If they want to sell
to the buyer with the highest Vi they have to sell at least  shares. Depending on
the value of  and on the distribution F(Vi) they can opt for either alternative. The
intuition is simply that increasing  is costly. Therefore the creditors will do it only
if it will enable them to end up with a more ecient buyer that might increase the
value of the minority stake they retain.
Notice that also in this case it is optimal (from the point of view of maximizing
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sell the company (or a fraction  of its equity) to a buyer i only if he has a valuation
Vi  V , where V  is such that
(1 + )V
   ( + )
1   F(V )
f(V )
= 0:
Once again, it is easy to see that the ex post ineciency, introduced by the reservation
price, is reduced when we decrease .
6. The Suggested Procedure and the Privatization of Bankruptcy
The key to our proposal of how to sell a company in bankruptcy is to leave the
creditors the option to sell less than 100% of the shares of the bankrupt company.
This objective can be practically implemented in a number of ways.
One way to proceed would be for example to transform the bankrupt rm in a
all equity rm. Then allocate the shares of this new rm to the creditors following
whatever procedure is most suitable for the creditors.14 Once this is done the creditors
are required to sell  % of their share so as to transfer the control to the buyer with
the highest valuation and retain the (1 ) % of their shares. The percentage  can
be chosen so as to maximize the creditors proceed in the way described in Sections
3, 4 and 5 above.
Alternatively the same procedure could be implemented by selling in a centralized
manner  % of the shares and distributing, following whatever criterion is preferred by
the creditors, both the monetary revenues from the sale and the residual percentage
(1   ) % of shares to the creditors ex-post. Either way the nal result would be
identical.
One could argue that there is no need to centralize and discipline the way in which
creditors sell their shares. In other words, we could simply transform the company in
an all equity rm, allocate all shares of the new company to the creditors (following
14In particular the creditors might want to follow absolute priority rule using for example the
procedure suggested in Bebchuk (1988) or might decide not to follow absolute priority rule. Notice
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any chosen priority rule) and then let the creditors, now shareholders, decide what to
do with the rm. This would be equivalent to privatizing the bankruptcy procedure:
it is only necessary to dene clearly the ownership rights of the creditors on the rm
and then they optimally decide what to do with it.
In this section we show that in the privatized procedure there always exists an
equilibrium that coincides with the one derived in the previous sections, one in which
the optimally chosen control stake of the equity, , is allocated in the hands of the
buyer who maximizes the rm's value. However, in the privatized procedure there
exist also other equilibria, which are both ex post and ex ante inecient. Hence
disciplining the way the creditors proceed in allocating the bankrupt rm is a way to
select the ecient equilibria of the game.
Assume that each creditor i is allocated si shares and that creditors have to decide
whether to sell an amount si of their shares, si  si. To keep the treatment as simple
as possible we restrict attention to the perfect information environment in which there
are only two potential buyers, 1 and 2, for the rm and there are no private benets
from control.15 We also assume that the creditors only decision is whether to sell or
not the amount si of shares. In other words, provided that creditors are willing to
tender their amount si of shares these shares are allocated to the most ecient buyer
in the way suggested in Sections 3 and 4 above.
Assume that the decision whether to tender an amount si of shares is taken by
each creditor simultaneously and independently. We denote p the share price paid by
buyer 2 and take V1=S  p < V2=S where S =
P
i si. Clearly a creditor can always
decide to sell the remaining shares in his hands (si si) immediately after the control
of the company is transferred in the hands of buyer 2 at the share price (V2=S).
The game we just described has a multiplicity of equilibria. In particular in the
case in which si <  for any i = 1;:::;N, there always exists an equilibrium in which
each creditor tenders zero shares, since he expects the other creditors to tender zero
shares as well. In other words, si = 0 for every i = 1;:::;N, is always an equilibrium
15The discussion can be easily extended to the case in which there are private bene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of this tendering game. This equilibrium is clearly ex-post inecient, since the rm
has no (or very low) value in the hands of the creditors while it has value V2 in the
hands of buyer 2. It is also ex-ante inecient, since the creditors revenues are not
maximized. The problem is the coordination failure among the creditors.16
It should be noticed, however, that there also exists an equilibrium which repro-
duces exactly the allocation of shares that we described in Sections 3 and 4 above
as the outcome of our suggested procedure. Indeed if creditor i believes that the
other creditors will sell exactly the percentage of shares ( ) %, where   (si=S),
then creditor i feels pivotal. It is therefore a best reply for creditor i to tender an
amount of shares S. The result is that the control is transferred to buyer 2, the rm
value is V2 and the total revenue obtained by the creditors is [pS + (1   )V2]. This
equilibrium is equivalent to the one derived in Section 3 above with a centralized
mechanism. Indeed, in the event that p = (V1=S) the creditors' revenue coincides
with the one in (1).
Disciplining and centralizing the procedure the creditors are supposed to use solves
the creditors' coordination problem. In other words it isolates as the unique outcome
the one which achieves ex-post as well as ex-ante eciency. It is possible to re-
interpret this discussion in favour of bankruptcy procedure that disciplines the way
creditors behave in the event of a corporate re-organization.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we propose a way to sell a company in bankruptcy that maximizes the
creditor's proceeds. For this purpose creditors should be free to separate the voting
rights of the rm from the cash ow rights. In particular in the absence of private
benets from control they should auction o the majority of the voting rights retaining
as much as possible of the cash ow rights. This can be done by both selling a low
fraction of shares or by changing the voting structure of the shares. When private
benets are present it is not any more optimal to separate completely voting and cash
16The logic is exactly the same of Grossman and Hart (1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986).How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 32
ow rights although creditors might still gain by retaining part of the cash ow rights
of the company. Therefore, the creditors' incentive to maximize their proceeds may
in general lead to a violation of the one-share-one vote principle at the restructuring
stage of a bankruptcy (Grossman and Hart 1988).
This way to sell a company in bankruptcy implies an optimal choice of the mini-
mum stake of the company  necessary to transfer control. In the absence of private
benets from control, it is clearly in the creditors' interests to minimize such stake,
for example by auctioning o a minimal number of shares (possibly one share) with
all the voting rights. However, the (public) value of a rm under the control from a
given buyer (i.e. the expected cash ows when that buyer is in control) may depend
on the fraction of cash ow rights that buyer has. In other words, if that buyer owns
too little cash ow rights in that company, he may not invest any eort in it and not
maximize its value. As a result, the choice of the number of shares with voting rights
would not be so extreme (one share would not be optimal). We do not model directly
this issue, since it is not crucial for our analysis: one may dene  as the fraction
of the cash ow rights which maximizes that trade-o, and our analysis would then
apply with  dened in this way.
The presence of private benets from control may also provide an incentive not to
sell the minimum number of shares. In fact, if the private benets of control are larger
the larger is the control stake the buyer obtains (as in Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi
(1998)), the creditors may want to increase the number of shares sold. Once again,
our analysis could be extended to consider  not as exogenous but as the fraction
that maximizes the surplus to be extracted. Our result will still go through once we
redene  in that way.How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 33
Appendix
A.1. Derivation of the rst and second order condition.
The incentive compatibility constraint (5) can be expressed as Vi = argmax~ Vi Ui(Vi; ~ Vi). Assuming













pi(x;V i)g i(V i)dV idx + Ui(0;0): (A.2)
Comparing the expression for Ui(Vi;Vi) in (A.2) and its denition in (2), solving for ti, we obtain:
Z
V
ti(V )g(V )dV =
Z
V












Integrating by parts, the above expression can be transformed into:
Z
V









pi(V )g(V )dV   Ui(0;0): (A.4)
Substituting (A.4) into (3) we obtain equation (8).




2 j ~ Vi=Vi 0: Recall the rst order
condition:
@Ui(Vi; ~ Vi)
@ ~ Vi j ~ Vi=Vi 0: Dierentiating this rst order condition on both sides with respect
to ~ Vi, we have
@2Ui(Vi; ~ Vi)
@Vi@ ~ Vi
j ~ Vi=Vi +
@2Ui(Vi; ~ Vi)
@ ~ Vi
2 j ~ Vi=Vi= 0:
Therefore, the second order condition is satised if:
@
2Ui(Vi; ~ Vi)







g i(V i)dV i  0; 8i 2 N; 8Vi 2 [0;  V ] (A.5)How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 34
A.2. Derivation of the rst and second order condition with trading















(the eects of a change of Vi on the extremes of integration compensate each other). Re-integrating
it, we get:

















We can set Ui(0;0) = 0 using the individual rationality constraint. Then, comparing the expression
for Ui(Vi;Vi) in (A.7) and its denition in (16), solving for ti, we obtain:
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V










































Integrating by parts, the above expression can be transformed into:
Z
V

































Substituting (A.9) into (3) we obtain equation (17).How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company 35
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